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Globalization of the food system is shaped by demand trends that bring about 
deep integration of agricultural production and marketing.  As diets and food quality 
become more similar around the world, risks are shared across borders, creating global 
public “goods” and “bads.”  Examples of globally shared food safety risks include acute 
risks such as microbial pathogens, as well as chronic risks, such as those arising from 
pesticide residues or mycotoxins.   Food safety is addressed as a global public good 
through private sector efforts, institutional innovations such as the SPS agreement under 
the WTO, and trade capacity building efforts to improve food safety management for 
developing country exports.  Data on food safety import violations from the U.S. and the 
EU show where the global food system is experiencing failures in delivering safe food.  
Microbial pathogens in seafood are an area of common concern; other problems reflect 
differences in standards between these two major high income markets.  WTO’s database 
on trade facilitation shows that most efforts focus on general capacity building and only a 
few address specific risks or commodities.   Although meeting standards for high income 
consumers motivates trade facilitation, the spillovers for developing country consumers 
from such investments could be large. 
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The links between food and health have received much attention in the last 
decade, with high profile media coverage of food safety risks and of nutrition research 
findings.  In part, this media coverage reflects the growing scientific understanding of 
food safety risks and ability to detect and track risks, as well as exciting advances in 
nutritional genomics and understanding of the functional characteristics of foods.  The 
appearance of this information in the media, together with rising consumer incomes and 
aging populations in high income countries, has spurred consumer food demand for 
health characteristics and for new food regulations.   
At the same time, diets and food delivery systems are becoming more similar 
around the world, and trade in high valued products is growing.  The standards and 
delivery systems in high income countries provide a model that is being adopted rapidly 
in middle income countries.  In this context, food-health linkages have become global 
public goods, because food-diet risks, benefits of risk control, and information, are 
increasingly interconnected across national boundaries.   
Institutional innovations are emerging to address food safety as a global public 
good, such as widely recognized private standards for food safety assurance, the SPS 
agreement under the WTO, and foreign assistance aimed at improving food safety 
management for developing country exports, sometimes called trade capacity building.  
Previous studies have examined quality assurance in the private sector (Henson and 
Reardon, 2005), the role of standards in reducing trade (eg., Otsuki, Wilson, and 
Sewadeh, 2001), and the effect of the SPS Agreement in mitigating trade disputes over 
food safety (Josling, Roberts, and Orden, 2004; Unnevehr and Roberts, 2005).  This 
  1paper will contribute to the literature in three ways:  First, the global public goods 
framework is used to recast approaches to addressing market failures, and to measuring 
costs and benefits from food safety improvement.  Second, how the global public goods 
framework could be used to address recurring food safety failures in international trade is 
examined.  Third, newly available data on trade capacity building provide a first look at 
this approach to sharing the costs of improvement.   
This paper begins with recent evidence on the “globalization” of food demand and 
food delivery, to demonstrate why demand for global public goods in the food system is 
growing.  Next, the conceptual framework for food safety as a global public good is 
presented, including the implications for cost-benefit analysis.  Then, the paper turns to 
food safety failures in international trade, as revealed by U.S. import detentions and EU 
alerts, and how investments in GPGs might address these failures.  Last, the trade 
capacity building investments by the U.S. and the EU, as reported to the WTO are 
examined to see how far these efforts address identified failures.  Implications are drawn 
for future investments in food safety as a global public good. 
“Globalization” in Diets and Food Delivery 
Income growth is a powerful force leading food expenditures towards certain 
universal patterns:  reduced consumption of starchy staples, increased consumption of 
meat, fruits, and vegetables, and processed high value foods (Bennett, 1941; Regmi and 
Gelhar, 2005).  These trends in demand are reshaping agricultural trade patterns.  Trade 
in high valued agricultural products is growing faster than trade in commodities since 
1990, and trade is growing faster as a percent of world production for income elastic 
commodities such as chicken and fruits (FAOSTAT).  Trade in perishable products such 
  2as seafood, meats, fruits and vegetables, doubled from 1990 to 2004 (FAOSTAT).  
Global food trade has become more specialized, with high income countries exporting 
grains and processed products to low and middle income countries, who in turn export 
labor-intensive horticultural and fishery products (Aksoy, 2005).  The growth in trade for 
perishable and high value products of all kinds reflects expanding global demand as 
incomes rise and technical barriers to trade are reduced (Dyck and Nelson, 2003; Gelhar 
and Regmi, 2005).  Even animal products, where emerging animal diseases have closed 
borders, have seen growth in trade (Blayney, Dyck, and Harvey, 2006). 
Changes in the composition of diets are not the only influence on the global food 
system.  Food product and retail models from high income countries have become 
increasingly common in middle income countries through expansion of multinational 
retail and food service chains (Reardon et al., 2003; Coyle, 2006).   Tastes and diets are 
being shaped by this global expansion of modern food retailing.  Table 1 shows selected 
indicators of food system modernization, summarized for selected high, upper middle, 
and lower middle income countries.  Demand for packaged foods, soft drinks, food 
service, and fast food are all highly income elastic, and show the expected pattern of 
increase across country income categories.  For example, packaged goods as a share of 
food sales increase from 26% for lower middle income countries to 52% for high income 
countries; annual fast food expenditures increase from $17 per capita to $191.  The share 
of food purchased in standardized retail outlets (supermarkets, hypermarkets, discounters, 
and convenience stores) also increases across income categories, from 53% in lower 
middle income countries to 76% in high income countries.  The rates of growth in these 
indicators are strikingly higher in the upper middle income countries.  Food service and 
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is faster than income growth in these countries.  Change is occurring most quickly in 
China, Indonesia, South Africa, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Brazil.  As this list of 
countries indicates, the changes are not confined to a particular region, but are occurring 
in middle income countries around the world.  
The expansion of multi-national retailing, food services, and high value products 
is leading to what Birdsall and Lawrence (1999) call “deep integration” in how food is 
produced, delivered, and consumed around the world.  This in turn leads to greater use of 
uniform standards of quality, content, and delivery (Caswell, Bredahl and Hooker, 1998; 
Gelhar and Regmi, 2005).  Deep integration inevitably brings increased sharing of food 
risks, including both acute and chronic risks.  As trade integrates the food supply, food 
safety risks are increasingly shared across borders.   
The demand for food safety improvements is increasing, driven by new science, 
more consumer awareness and the higher income needed to translate desire into effective 
demand.  New science and new detection methods have improved our understanding of 
risks and their consequences.  Changes in food production, marketing, and consumption 
have altered the incidence of risks and shifted responsibility from consumers to 
producers.  Larger operations to produce meat or fish can introduce new hazards or speed 
the spread of existing ones.  The increased purchase of prepared food or use of food 
service reduces consumer control over food preparation, shifting responsibility for safety 
to the food industry.  Consumer awareness and incomes are both increasing, leading to 
greater demand for safety.  Both the food industry and regulators have responded with 
new public and private standards.   
  4In spite of this increased attention, food safety remains an important risk even in 
developed countries.  In the U.S., the CDC estimates that there are 76 million cases of 
foodborne illness annually, and 5,200 deaths.  In 2000, the USDA/ERS estimated that the 
cost of five common pathogens was $6.9 billion in terms of medical expenses and lost 
productivity (USDA/ERS).  The negative consequences of poor food safety is even more 
important  in the developing world, where the WHO estimates that as much as 70 percent 
of the 1.8 million annual deaths from diarrhea are linked to contaminated food. Exposure 
to mycotoxins that pose chronic cancer risks is an important risk in parts of Africa.  
Pesticide exposure in the farm environment has also been implicated in farm household 
health in developing countries.   Thus, food safety risks are a global concern.  The next 
section of the paper considers how food safety improvements could be viewed as a global 
public good. 
The Global Public Good Framework and Food Safety 
Ferroni and Mody (2002) define a global public good (GPG) as a “benefit 
providing utility that is, in principle, available on an international scale” (p. 6).  Examples 
include property rights, predictability, and nomenclature, which can enable provision of 
final public goods, such as health or environmental quality (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 
1999; Ferroni and Mody, 2002).  The potential for GPGs arises whenever externalities 
(either positive or negative) cross borders (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999).  To be truly 
global public goods, they must be non-rival and non-excludable across international 
borders and global in scope.  Of course, there are degrees to goods are non-rival or non-
excludable in practice and there are variations in the international scope of GPG.   
  5Before considering why food safety is a global public good, it is useful to 
consider why it is often a local or national public good.  Frequent public intervention at 
the national level to ensure food safety arises from several public goods characteristics.  
Individual producers or firms may not be able to adequately control a food safety hazard 
(externality) without cooperative effort, and the public sector may be needed to enforce 
controls, certify sanitary conditions (non-excludability), or to make supporting 
infrastructure investments.  Consumers may not be able to judge food safety or to avoid 
hazards (information asymmetry) or it may be desirable to protect vulnerable groups 
(equity), such as small children, by setting a minimum safety standard.    
The changes in international trade, demand, and regulation discussed above have 
made food safety a global public good.  With growth in food and animal trade, food 
safety risks, costs of hazard reduction, and benefits from improvement are all shared 
across borders.  Food produced under one safety regime must pass standards under 
another, and standards are increasingly stringent.  Risks vary across countries because 
there are differences in how food is produced and eaten.  While trade can provide 
alternatives for consumers and potentially lower costs of safety, it can also introduce 
unfamiliar hazards or new hazards can disrupt trade.  Incentives and information may be 
imperfect in international supply chains, many of which are relatively new. 
Three potential “gaps” hinder provision of GPGs:  a jurisdictional gap (when 
national borders become irrelevant); a participation gap (when new groups need to 
participate in governance); and an incentives gap (when international cooperation is not 
backstopped by incentives to change behavior) (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999).  Food 
safety has all three gaps:  There is a jurisdictional gap between the importing market and 
  6the exporting producer.  There is an incentives gap when consumers in one country do 
not fully reward efforts for food safety improvement in another country, often because 
they cannot distinguish safety in the marketplace.  Finally, there can be a participation 
gap in setting food safety standards; in other words, not all countries contribute equally to 
the process.   
Three categories of approaches to internalizing global incentives have been 
identified (Ferroni and Mody, 2003).  “Best shot”, exemplified by the Gates Foundation 
investment in malaria vaccine development, pushes or pulls private innovation using 
public funds. “Summation” is the development of global mechanisms to enforce 
individual behavior, so that the “sum” of individual actions leads to the desired outcome. 
An example is the development of standards for sustainable forestry to inform green 
labels and consumer choice. “Weakest link” is the use of foreign aid to overcome the 
constraint imposed by those providing the smallest effort, for example when poor 
countries receive a subsidy to control animal or plant disease to prevent its spread 
elsewhere.    
Food safety has been addressed as a GPG using all three approaches to 
internalizing incentives.   The “weakest link” is addressed through foreign aid to help 
developing countries improve food safety in exports.  An example of “summation” or the 
application of mechanisms to enforce behavior along the supply chain or among countries 
can be found in the private sector’s use of third party certification or in the application of 
internationally recognized principles to food safety regulation.  “Best shot” approaches to 
motivate innovation include investments in research for managing or assessing risks, such 
as development of new testing and tracking technologies.   
  7Using the GPG framework to assessment food safety issues, there are at least 
three sets of questions.  First, there are questions related to sharing risks, costs and 
benefits.  For example, when would investments from one country in another country 
have benefits for the donor as well as the recipient?  When would it yield overall welfare 
gains for one country to subsidize costs of control in another country?   Such questions 
relate to the role of foreign aid in trade capacity building.  
Second, there are questions related to the global consequences of individual 
countries’ regulations.  When would an adjustment of standards result in benefits from 
trade that more than offset consumer risk?  Would harmonization of food safety standards 
increase or decrease consumer welfare?  Would harmonization ease the costs of 
coordinating control?  These questions are currently addressed most often by the SPS 
Agreement under the WTO, and the related institutional framework for standards under 
the Codex Alimentarius. 
Third, there are a set of questions about how best to enhance global welfare 
through capturing spillover benefits from investments in food safety.  For example, if 
some global food safety czar could direct investments, where would they have the highest 
marginal net benefit?  When would international coordination of management activities 
reduce the total costs of control?  Could information in international markets be improved 
so as to internalize incentives for food safety improvement?  Such questions are beyond 
the scope of most current institutional frameworks. 
Next, I consider how these questions are reflected in important food safety 
failures in international supply chains.   
  8Food Safety Issues in International Trade 
One indicator of breakdowns in global food safety management is provided by 
public monitoring and rejection of food imports for failure to meet food safety standards.  
Product refusals and recalls have high private costs.  When imports are refused or general 
alerts are raised about a product, it represents a failure in food safety management.  When 
such refusals or alerts occur frequently for particular hazards or products, it is clear that 
management is challenging and imperfect.  This may suggest areas for public 
intervention or investment.  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration reports information from import 
monitoring on their website for the past 12 months 
(http://www.fda.gov/ora/oasis/ora_oasis_ref.html ).  U.S. FDA detention data have been 
analyzed by several authors, including Unnevehr (2000), Caswell and Wang (2001), and 
Allshouse, et al (2002).  The European Commission posts annual summary reports of 
similar problems, called rapid alerts 
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm ), which reflect notifications of 
safety problems by member countries.  Most of these alerts are for imports from third 
countries.  Jaffee and Henson (2005) looked at both U.S. and E.C. data, and concluded 
that standards pose minimal barriers to trade overall.  I examine these two data to see 
what recurring problems suggest failures in either private management or public policy.   
Table 2 reports summary information from these two data sources.  For the U.S., 
most detentions arise from problems of microbial hazards in seafood and pesticides in 
vegetables, and to a lesser extent, contamination in fruits or nuts. (Meat and poultry are 
not prominent due to the separate import monitoring system that requires USDA audits of 
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sources of products most often detained include Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia for 
seafood; China, Guatemala, and Mexico, for vegetables.  These patterns are similar to 
those reported in other analyses, and are likely to be representative of longer term issues.  
Middle income countries are the most important sources of problems. Although they are 
important suppliers, it is not solely the volume of their trade that results in their 
overrepresentation in the detentions data base.  For example, the rate of detentions for 
seafood imports was much higher for Thailand than for Canada, even though both export 
similar volumes to the U.S. (Allshouse, et. al., 2002). 
The EU 2004 Rapid Alert report shows that mycotoxins, chemical contaminants 
(eg., prohibited food dyes), microbial pathogens, and veterinary drug residues are the 
most important hazards appearing in alerts related to products from third countries.  Nuts 
(the primary source of violative mycotoxins), seafood/fish, meats and poultry, and fruits 
are the most important products implicated in alerts.  Third countries of origin that were 
most common in alerts included three exporters of nuts to the EU: Iran, Turkey, and 
China; as well as two exporters of fish and/or meat:  Brazil and India.   
For both the E.U. and U.S., it is middle income exporting countries that are most 
often implicated in food safety alerts or detentions.  Microbial pathogens in seafood and 
fish are a common and recurring problem.   Other issues of importance differ between 
these two importers, reflecting differences in standards and regulation.  In the EU, 
mycotoxins and chemical contaminants are more important.  This reflects, at least in part, 
the very high standards for mycotoxins imposed by the EU in 2001.  These standards 
were controversial, and elicited considerable comment from trading partners (eg., Otsuki, 
  10Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001).  The 2004 alert data show that these standards are indeed a 
source of continuing difficulty for exporters of nuts to the EU.  For the U.S., mycotoxins 
and food additives are not as important in detention data, but pesticide residues are at 
issue.   Zepp, Kuchler, and Lucier (1998) found that most pesticide residue violations in 
U.S. imports are for unregistered chemicals, rather than for residues that exceed 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs).   
Addressing Food Safety Failures as Global Public Goods 
The type of market failure differs among these food safety hazards, but in all 
cases, international trade has made the local or national public good into a global public 
good.  For each hazard, the GPG questions raised above are considered.  These include 
the type of trade capacity building needed, whether international standard setting could 
mitigate failures, and whether there would be spillover benefits for consumers in the 
exporting country. 
Microbial hazards 
Microbial hazards are naturally occurring and increasingly regulated in high 
income countries.  Their importance in seafood trade reflects the difficulties of enforcing 
sanitation and cold chain control over a longer supply chain, as well as in countries with 
minimal public sanitation infrastructure (eg., Cato and Subasinge, 2003).   Microbial 
pathogens can enter the food supply at any point during processing and transit, multiply 
once present, and spread more widely as a result of commingled supply sources.  Thus, 
incentives for control may be difficult to enforce or internalize.  Capacity building 
investment for this hazard would ideally address the “weakest link”, by focusing on 
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Point (HACCP) system.  Standards and equivalence are difficult to define for this hazard, 
as it is costly to test (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999).  Verification focuses on assessment of 
processes more often than products.  This makes it difficult to determine equivalence in 
internationally trade products.  There are likely large spillover benefits for consumers 
within the exporting country from improvements in microbial pathogen control, as this is 
such an important source of health risk in developing countries.   
Pesticides 
Pesticides are regulated so as to minimize risks to human health and the 
environment.  In the U.S., pesticides are registered for use only on particular crops. Some 
violations in international trade arise from an “orphan goods” problem.  There are 
insufficient incentives to undertake the costs of registration for minor uses outside of the 
U.S., leading to the violations that arise from unregistered uses.  For registered uses that 
exceed MRLs, research and extension are needed for integrated pest management in 
tropical horticulture (as illegal pesticide use is rarely economic).   The knowledge base 
for IPM in tropical horticultural crops is an area of underinvestment (Norton, et al., 
2003).  Thus, the needed capacity building investments would foster this type of 
innovation.   Problems with unregistered chemicals might be overcome by use of  
Codex’s internationally recognized MRL standards.  The spillover benefits of better 
pesticide management for developing country producers, through reduced exposure in the 
farm environment, are likely larger than the benefits from reduced residues for high 
income consumers.    
  12Mycotoxins 
Mycotoxins, produced by fungi on crops, are a naturally occurring hazard, which 
is more likely to be present in certain production conditions, especially in the humid 
tropics.  Management in crop production and marketing can reduce the incidence of 
mycotoxins, but they are sometimes impossible to eliminate in the food supply, except 
through diversion of supply to alternative uses, such as animal feeds.  Capacity building 
investment could foster innovation in management, and inspection and certification to 
internalize incentives.  This is a hazard that might be mitigated by trade, if supply from 
areas with lower incidence can replace supply from areas with higher incidence.  The 
differences in standards among high income countries provide a likely opportunity for 
gains from harmonization.  Again, the spillover benefits for developing country 
consumers might be substantial, especially for control of mycotoxins in staples. 
Veterinary drug residues 
Veterinary drug use is regulated to reduce risks to human and animal health.  
Illegal veterinary drug residues arise from use of banned drugs or illegal use of drugs, and 
these pose various kinds of risks to consumers, including possible allergic reactions, 
chronic health risks from exposure, or the development of antibiotic-resistant organisms.     
Capacity building investments might include inspection and monitoring, or research on 
improved management.  It is possible that subsidies to reduce antibiotic use would have 
global public health benefits in preventing the development of resistance.  Standards 
differ among countries, and harmonization to the Codex standard would enhance trade 
(Wilson, Otsuki, Majumdsar, 2003), although it is not clear how it might alter consumer 
  13risks.  Spillover benefits might be large for consumers everywhere, if retention of 
antibiotic effectiveness results from more effective regulation.   
The hazards identified as issues in data from these two major markets are not the 
only food safety issues in international trade, but they do represent issues of recurring 
concern.  Moreover, they represent long standing hazards that have been controversial in 
regulation and are costly to manage in any country.  Fortunately, with the possible 
exception of microbial pathogens, the likely risks to high income consumers from the 
identified “failures” in food safety are small.  And, trade in most of the commodities 
highlighted in Table 2 has been expanding, notwithstanding food safety issues. 
There do seem to be opportunities for global gain.  First, capacity building 
investments might include research to support management and control of hazards, 
improved infrastructure for sanitation and preservation, and inspection or monitoring to 
support certification.  Second, greater efforts towards equivalence recognition or even 
harmonization of international standards would mitigate difficulties for all of the above 
hazards.  These two areas have been identified as the least successful elements of the SPS 
Agreement implementation (Unnevehr and Roberts, 2005), suggesting the need for 
greater investment in these facilitating mechanisms.   Such investments have been 
subsidized by efforts since 2001 to support developing country participation in the 
international standard setting bodies.  However, the political will to adopt and utilize 
internationally recognized standards is still lacking in many cases.  Third, the existence of 
stringent standards in high income countries may provide the motivation for investments 
in food safety in developing countries that have large spillover benefits for developing 
country consumers and producers.   
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In 2001, WTO members agreed on steps to improve implementation of the current 
agreements at the Doha Ministerial (WTO 2001). These initiatives included, among 
others, increased technical and financial assistance to enable developing countries to 
increase their participation in the international standards organizations and to fulfill their 
obligations (such as the creation of enquiry points) under these agreements; and  
increased technical assistance to help developing countries to comply with new standards 
if they pose significant impediments to trade. 
The WTO and the OECD jointly maintain the Doha Development Agenda Trade 
Capacity Building Database (http://tcbdb.wto.org/index.asp?lang=ENG), which provides 
information on bilateral and multilateral efforts to build trade capacity in less developed 
countries.  Projects specifically addressing Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures were 
downloaded for analysis on May 30, 2006.  These data reflect efforts from 2001 through 
2005; with incomplete data for 2006.  There were a total of 695 SPS projects, with total 
expenditures of $270 million.   
Table 3 reports information about the projects funded by the U.S. and the EU 
(including member countries).    The U.S. funded $31 million in 237 projects; and the EU 
invested $176 million in 117 projects.   These two major donors account for half of the 
projects and three-quarters of the funding represented in the database on SPS projects.  
Project descriptions available in the database were used to classify projects according to 
whether they are general investments in capacity building (e.g., training on SPS issues, 
workshops, consultations) or whether they address specific risks, management methods, 
or commodities (Table 3).  Most projects funded by the U.S. and the EU fell into the 
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(e.g., a training workshop is held with participation from several developing countries or 
the same workshop is repeated in several countries).   
U.S. projects with a specific focus addressed commodities and risks identified as 
issues in the FDA data, i.e., fish and fruits & vegetables, food safety and pesticides.  The 
methods that were the focus of capacity building would largely translate into better food 
safety control.  Two of the countries identified in Table 3 (Mexico, China) were also 
among those receiving multiple capacity building efforts.  Thus, specific U.S. efforts line 
up fairly well with the difficulties facing exporters to the U.S.   
The EU projects with a specific focus were balanced across the three categories of 
SPS risks, or were focused on inspection and testing methods which can address all three 
risks.  Commodities included those among the highest risk but nuts and fish were not 
highly represented.  Of the countries receiving assistance, Iran stands out as also 
appearing in Table 2, and two of the three projects for Iran address mycotoxins (these 
were the only projects specifically addressing that risk).  Thus, specific EU efforts also 
tend to line up with risks as identified in the Alert data, with the exception of mycotoxins 
in nuts.   
Trade facilitation, particularly focused on SPS measures, is a relatively new 
activity.  The emphasis on general capacity building can be seen as a sensible first step, 
that sets the stage for more specific activities in particular sectors or to address particular 
risks.  The focus on inspection, testing, and food safety management in some projects is 
also a way to address multiple risks, with potential positive spillovers for recipient 
country consumers.    
  16Conclusions and Implications for Future Global Investments 
The global public goods framework is appropriate for food safety, given the 
increased international sharing of risks, costs, and benefits from food safety 
improvement.    The kinds of global public goods needed fall into three categories:  
sharing of costs, coordination of risk management, and capturing international spillovers 
from investments.   All of these public goods are relevant to the food safety issues that 
appear in the growing food export trade from developing countries to developed 
countries.   
Three food safety problems present continuing challenges –  microbial pathogens 
in seafood, fish, and meat; pesticide residues on horticultural products, and mycotoxins in 
nuts.    All of these challenges might be mitigated through greater attention to 
harmonization and equivalence in setting standards, reinforcing the finding of Unnevehr 
and Roberts (2005) that these were areas of relative weakness in implementation of the 
SPS Agreement.  Although higher standards in developed countries impose costs and 
barriers to trade, they also motivate foreign aid for trade capacity building.  Such capacity 
building could address these challenges through investments in research to support 
management and control of hazards, improved infrastructure for sanitation and 
preservation, and inspection or monitoring to support certification.  Recent trade capacity 
building efforts are largely very general in nature, and likely represent only the first step 
towards meaningful efforts to reduce hazards.  Finally, the spillover benefits from such 
investments are likely to be large for developing country consumers in the long run.   
 Because it is increasingly a global public good, there is likely underinvestment in 
food safety.  Directing GPG investments for greatest global benefit will require 
  17understanding of the incidence of benefits and costs both within and across borders, of 
the potential benefits from coordination in standard setting and control, and of the 
potential positive spillovers.   Such research will help to motivate future investment by 
demonstrating the potential benefits. 
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High Income   
Level Growth  Level Growth  Level Growth 
Share of food sales 
in standardized 










Share of packaged 


















































Source:  Euromonitor. 
Lower Middle income includes Brazil, Colombia, Peru, China, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia 
Upper Middle income includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Chile, Mexico, 
Malaysia, South Africa 
High Income includes Canada, USA, Australia, Japan, France, UK, Germany, 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, 
Portugal 
 
Level is average for latest year available (indicated in parentheses) 
Growth is absolute change for percentage (share) indicators and percentage 
change for absolute variables; years are indicated in parentheses.  Country with the fastest 
growth rate is indicated for each variable. 
Standardized retail outlets includes supermarkets, hypermarkets, discounters, and 
convenience stores. 
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Table 2:  Food Safety Management “Failures” in Global Supply Chains 
 
  U.S. FDA Import 
Detentions, 2001 
EU Notifications, 2004 
Most important hazards  Microbial contamination 
(eg., salmonella in seafood), 
 
Pesticide residues (eg. 
violative residues on 
vegetables), 
 
Other sanitary violations 




contaminants (eg., additives 





Veterinary drug residues 













Meat & poultry 
 
Fruits & vegetables 
 
Spices 
Most important countries 
of origin 
Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Indonesia for Seafood 
 
China, Guatemala, and 
Mexico for Vegetables 
Iran (nuts)  
 
Turkey (nuts, F&V, spices)  
 
China (nuts, F&V)  
 
India (seafood, spices) 
 
Brazil (poultry, meat, 
seafood) 
 
Sources:   
Annual Report on the Functioning of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF), 2004, European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate 
General, http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/report2004_en.pdf, accessed May 5, 
2006.  
FDA Import Detention Data, 2001, unpublished analysis by Buzby, Unnevehr, 
and Allshouse;  and Allshouse, et al., Seafood Trade and Food Safety, Ch 7 in 
International Trade and Food Safety, AER828, USDA/ERS.
  24Table 3:  Technical Assistance for SPS Issues, 2001- May 2006 
 
 U.S.  EU 
  Number  Million $   Number  Million $ 















Capacity Building  150 24.8 41 47.8 
    
Risk specific  46(23) 2.1 47 (63) 51.2 
Most important risks  General food safety  
Pesticides  
Microbial 
General Food Safety 
Phytosanitary 
Animal Health 














Fruits & Vegetables 
Meats & Poultry 
 
Source:  WTO Trade Capacity Building Database, SPS projects, 
http://tcbdb.wto.org/index.asp?lang=ENG, accessed May 20, 2006.  Data for 2001-2005 
are complete; 2006 is partial. 
Notes:  Methods include HACCP, Process Control, Sanitation, GAPs, GMPs, 
Inspection, Testing and Laboratories, and Traceability.  Commodities includes fish, fruits 
and vegetables, grains, meats, herbs/medicines, cocoa/coffee, animal feeds, animal by-
products, and forestry products.  Risks include pesticides, grain standards, mycotoxins, 
veterinary drug residues, animal health, bioterrorism, biotechnology, bioengineering, 
microbial, general food risks (eg acrylamide, food additives) and phytosanitary. 
EU projects include those administered by the European Commission, as well as 
bilateral projects originating from EU members:  France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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